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We present a mathematical model of the eBay auction protocol and perform a detailed analysis of
the effects that the eBay proxy bidding system and the minimum bid increment have on the auction
properties. We ﬁrst consider the revenue of the auction, and we show analytically that when two
bidders with independent private valuations use the eBay proxy bidding system there exists an
optimal value for the minimum bid increment at which the auctioneer’s revenue is maximized. We
then consider the sequential way in which bids are placed within the auction, and we show ana-
lytically that independent of assumptions regarding the bidders’ valuation distribution or bidding
strategy the number of visible bids placed is related to the logarithm of the number of potential
bidders. Thus, in many cases, it is only a minority of the potential bidders that are able to submit
bids and are visible in the auction bid history (despite the fact that the other hidden bidders are
still effectively competing for the item). Furthermore, we show through simulation that the min-
imum bid increment also introduces an inefﬁciency to the auction, whereby a bidder who enters
the auction late may ﬁnd that its valuation is insufﬁcient to allow them to advance the current bid
by the minimum bid increment despite them actually having the highest valuation for the item.
Finally, we use these results to consider appropriate strategies for bidders within real world eBay
auctions. We show that while last-minute bidding (sniping) is an effective strategy against bidders
engaging in incremental bidding (and against those with common values), in general, delaying
bidding is disadvantageous even if delayed bids are sure to be received before the auction closes.
Thus, when several bidders submit last-minute bids, we show that rather than seeking to bid as
late as possible, a bidder should try to be the ﬁrst sniper to bid (i.e., it should “snipe before the
snipers”).
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1. INTRODUCTION
The growth of the Web has ensured that electronic commerce, once the preserve
of large corporations, is now an everyday activity for millions of private indi-
viduals and small businesses. eBay, the world’s most popular online auction
house, represents a canonical example of this phenomenon. Through a simple
andintuitiveWebinterface,itallowsbuyersandsellerstocometogetherwithin
a worldwide virtual market, and its popularity is evidence of both its successful
design and the public demand for these services1.
Described brieﬂy, the eBay auction protocol is a variation of an ascending
price auction with a minimum bid increment and a ﬁxed closing time. Buyers
interested in bidding within an auction do not submit bids directly. Rather, they
must use a proxy bidding system that requires that they specify the maximum
amount that they are willing bid (with the constraint that this amount must
exceed the current auction price plus a minimum bid increment, d). The proxy
bidding system then automatically submits bids on their behalf, and the eBay
protocol guarantees that the bidder who has entered the highest amount wins
the item, but pays no more than the amount entered by the second highest
bidderplustheminimumbidincrement.Indeed,eBayrecommendsthatbidders
simplyenterthemaximumamountthattheyarewillingtopayfortheitem,and
leave the proxy bidding system to perform all the resulting bidding (see eBay
help: Bid increments), available online at http://pages.ebay.com/help/buy/
bid-increments.html.
While eBay has been the subject of signiﬁcant academic research, the major-
ity of this work has been limited to phenomenology (observing what happens in
actual auctions and supplying qualitative explanations of the observed effects).
As such, it has often been stated that the eBay auction protocol behaves as a
second price auction whereby the expected auction revenue is equal to the sec-
ond highest bidder’s valuation plus the minimum bid increment [Bapna 2003;
Ockenfels and Roth 2006]. However, this assumption apparently contradicts
previous results (including our recent work) that shows that, whenever the
bids that may be submitted to the auctioneer are restricted to certain discrete
levels, then the auction generates less revenue than the second highest bid-
ders’ valuation [Rothkopf and Harstad 1994; David et al. 2007]. To resolve this
contradiction, in this article we construct a mathematical model of the eBay
1In 2006, eBay listed more than 2.2 billion items and generated gross merchandise sales of $52.2
billion [eBay 2006].
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auction protocol. Using this model, we carry out, for the ﬁrst time, a detailed
analysis of how the minimum bid increment and the eBay proxy bidding system
affect the properties of the eBay auction.
First, we consider the revenue of an eBay auction, and we calculate analyti-
cally the expected revenue in the case that two bidders with private valuation
usetheeBayproxybiddingsystem(and,assuggestedbyeBay,thesebiddersen-
ter their valuations as the maximum amount that they are willing to pay for the
itemassoonastheybecomeawareoftheauction).Weshowthat,inthiscase,the
revenueoftheauctionisdependentonthevalueoftheminimumbidincrement,
and that there exists an optimal value at which this revenue is maximized. At
this optimal value, the revenue does indeed exceed the second highest bidder’s
valuation (but by an amount that is less than the minimum bid increment). To
fully understand this effect, we compare it to the case where the two bidders
employ a pedestrian bidding strategy (i.e., each time they are outbid, they in-
crease the current bid by the minimum bid increment). We again analytically
calculate the expected revenue of the auction, and we show that, in this case,
the auction generates a revenue that is less than the valuation of the second
highest bidder. Comparing these two results indicates that it is the interaction
of the eBay proxy bidding system and the minimum bid increment, and not the
minimum bid increment alone, that is responsible for the increased auction rev-
enue. We conﬁrm this result for larger numbers of bidders through simulation.
Second, we consider the fact that, unlike conventional auctions, an eBay
auction does not commence with all the bidders being present. Instead, the
bidders arrive in a random order that is dependent on the time at which they
ﬁrst become aware of the auction’s existence (typically through searching the
eBay Web site). We show through simulation that the proxy bids of the early
bidders cause the current price of the auction to increase rapidly, and hence
bidders who enter the auction late may ﬁnd that their valuation is insufﬁcient
to allow them to advance the current bid by the minimum bid increment. Thus
the number of bids that are observed in an eBay auction (and recorded in the
auction history) can be substantially smaller than the number of bidders who
would have liked to place a bid. We calculate an analytic expression for this
relationship in the limiting case that the minimum bid increment d = 0 and
we show that the number of bids received is approximately proportional to the
logarithm of the number of bidders who would have liked to place a bid. This
analysis is attractive as it is independent of any assumptions regarding the dis-
tribution of bids placed within the auction (or the valuations of the bidders). It
also represents the maximum number of bids that may be observed; increasing
either the minimum bid increment or the starting bid only reduces the chance
that a bidder will have a valuation that is sufﬁcient to allow them to place a
bid. This result suggests that care must be taken when attempting to infer the
behavior of bidders through observation of the bid history, and thus empirical
studies that neglect this effect may be incorporating systematic errors. In addi-
tion, it shows that the minimum bid increment introduces an inefﬁciency in to
the auction, in that the bidder with the highest valuation does not always win.
We show through simulation that, the earlier bidders submit their valuation to
the eBay proxy bidding system, the greater their chance of winning the auction.
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This last observation appears to contradict the extensive literature that sug-
gests that last minute bidding or sniping is an effective strategy within an eBay
auction [Roth and Ockenfels 2003]. Thus we consider how these observations
determine the bidding strategy that a bidder should adopt within a real eBay
auction. Our results show that, while late bidding is effective in the case of com-
mon values or when other bidders engage in incremental bidding (i.e., rather
thanusingtheproxybiddingsystemaseBayintended,theyrepeatedlyincrease
the amount that they are willing to pay whenever they are outbid2), in general,
due to the inefﬁciency discussed above, bidding late is disadvantageous. Thus,
when several bidders snipe, we show that, rather than seeking to place the last
bid, bidders should try to be the ﬁrst sniper to submit their bid (i.e., they should
“snipe before the snipers”).
These results signiﬁcantly advance the understanding of the eBay auction
protocol. They can be used by institutions attempting to construct similar on-
line auctions, since our analysis indicates how the value of the minimum bid
increment should be chosen to maximize the revenue that the auction gen-
erates. In addition, our observation that the number of bids observed within
an eBay auction is signiﬁcantly smaller than the number of bidders who at-
tempted to place a bid (and the related analytical calculation) is extremely
important for researchers performing empirical studies of eBay auctions using
the auction bid history. Finally, our insights into the timing of snipe bids can be
used by bidders in real eBay auctions to maximize their chance of winning the
item.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents re-
lated work. Section 3 describes the eBay protocol and the proxy bidding system
in more detail and Section 4 presents our analysis of the revenue of the eBay
auction.Section5considershowthesequentialupdateofthecurrentbidaffects
the auction properties and Section 6 considers the resulting bidding behavior.
Finally, we conclude and discuss future work in Section 7.
2. RELATED WORK
The growth of Web-based electronic commerce has initiated much research
into the design of novel mechanisms for online auctions [Fontoura et al. 2002],
and also effective bidding strategies for automated bidding agents [Guo 2002;
Dumas et al. 2002; Anthony and Jennings 2003]. However, much less research
has addressed the speciﬁc implementation details of auction mechanisms that
have proved to be popular and effective in real online settings (such as eBay).
What work does exist in this area has tended to focus on observing bidding
within eBay auctions (typically through an analysis of the bid history that eBay
makes available on its Web site) and then attempting to form qualitative expla-
nations of the observed effects (see Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) and Ockenfells
et al. (2007) for reviews of this work). Typical work within this area has con-
sidered how the closing price of the auction is affected by the various auction
settings, such as the starting bid, the reserve price, the shipping costs, and the
2Pedestrianbidding,wherethebidisraisedbytheminimumbidincrementeachtime,isanextreme
form of incremental bidding.
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auction duration [Lucking-Reiley 2000; Bajari and Hortacsu 2003; Hossain and
Morgan 2006; Gerding et al. 2007].
In addition, other research has considered the behavior of bidders within
these auctions [Shah et al. 2003; Bapna 2003; Roth and Ockenfels 2003]. A
key observation in this respect has been the fact that in many eBay auctions
a signiﬁcant number of bids are placed in the last few minutes before the auc-
tion closes. Many explanations have been proposed for this last-minute bidding
and it is commonly believed that sniping is the best response to na¨ ive bidders
engaging in incremental bidding [Roth and Ockenfels 2003]. It has also been
suggested that, in common-value auctions, such last-minute bidding prevents
the disclosure of information, and thus prevents other bidders from responding
with an updated bid [Bajari and Hortacsu 2003]. 3 Furthermore, a number of
researchers have suggested that last-minute bidding may also protect a bid-
der from a form of shill bidding, commonly known as maximum-bid ﬁshing,
whereby the seller submits small incremental shill bids to expose the value of
the highest bid, and thus forces the highest bidder to pay their full bid [Barbaro
and Bracht 2004; Engelberg and Williams 2005].
However, despite this extensive body of research, little work has considered
thespeciﬁcdetailsoftheeBayauctionprotocol,suchastheoperationoftheeBay
proxy bidding system, the use of a minimum bid increment,4 and the fact that
bidders generally arrive within the eBay auction after bidding has commenced.
Instead, the eBay auction protocol is commonly assumed to behave as a second-
priceauction,anditisoftenstatedthattheexpectedauctionrevenueisequalto
the second highest bidders’ valuation plus the minimum bid increment [Bapna
2003;OckenfelsandRoth2006].Intheworkthatwepresenthere,weshowthat
these assumptions are too simplistic. By constructing a mathematical model
of the eBay auction protocol and then performing a detailed analysis of its
properties, we are able to gain signiﬁcant and novel insights into the operation
of the eBay auction protocol that can be used by designers of online auctions,
by other researchers performing empirical studies of real eBay auctions and
ﬁnally, by bidders within these auctions.
3. THE EBAY AUCTION
Weconsiderthesingle-itemeBayauctionprotocol5 and,toexplainitsoperation,
we describe the sequence of events as the bidding proceeds. The auction process
3Last-minute bidding has also been shown to be an equilibrium strategy in private-valuation auc-
tions where there is some small probability that last-minute bids are dropped [Ockenfels and Roth
2006].
4Other work has considered the effect of the minimum bid increment within ascending-price
discrete-bid English auctions [Rothkopf and Harstad 1994; David et al 2005, 2007]. However, the
additional details of the eBay auction make it difﬁcult to apply these general results in this speciﬁc
case, and this motivates the more detailed study that we present here.
5eBay also offers a multiple-item auction format that they often refer to as a Dutch auction
(see eBay help: Multiple item auction, avalaible online at http://pages.ebay.com/help/buy/
buyer-multiple.html). This auction format is actually quite different from the descending price
auctions used in the Dutch ﬂower markets that are commonly referred to as Dutch auctions within
the academic literature of auctions. In the multiple-item eBay auction, bidders specify the quantity
of items that they wish to purchase and the maximum price that they are willing to pay per item.
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Table I. Mininum Bid Increment Implemented
by eBay (see ebay help:Bid Increments,
available online at http://pages.
ebay.com/help/buy/bid-increments.html)
Current auction price Bid increment
$0.01–$0.99 $0.05
$1.00–$4.99 $0.25
$5.00–$24.99 $0.50
$25.00–$99.99 $1.00
$100.00–$249.99 $2.50
$250.00–$499.99 $5.00
$500.00–$999.99 $10.00
$1000.00–$2499.99 $25.00
$2500.00–$4999.99 $50.00
$ 5000.00 and up $100.00
commences with the seller determining the auction duration (i.e., number of
days that the auction will run) and the starting bid of the auction, s. This
starting bid represents the minimum bid that is acceptable to the seller, and
corresponds to the reserve price described in the standard auction literature6.
Thus, the seller is not committed to selling the item until a bidder submits a bid
with a value greater than or equal to this starting bid. However, once a suitable
bid has been received, the current bid price of the auction is set to this starting
bid and normal bidding can commence. From this point onward, all bids must
exceed the current bid by a minimum bid increment, d. This minimum bid
increment takes a predetermined value depending on the current bid price (see
Table I). For example, when the bid current auction price is between $1.00 and
$4.99, the minimum bid increment is $0.25 (see eBay help: Bid increments,
avaliable online at http://pages.ebay.com/help/buy/bid-increments.html).
Bidders who wish to bid within the eBay auction cannot do so directly, but
must use a proxy bidding system that submits bids on their behalf. They must
enter the maximum price that they are prepared to bid, and, to be accepted,
this amount must be greater than, or equal to, the current bid price plus the
minimum bid increment. In practice, eBay recommends that bidders simply
enter the maximum price that they are willing to pay for the item (i.e., their
valuation), and leave the proxy bidding system to perform all the resulting
bidding. While it is commonly assumed that the eBay proxy bidding system
engages in pedestrian bidding (i.e., increasing the bid price by the minimum
bid increment each time it is outbid), a detailed reading of the eBay bidding
instructions and some experimental bidding in real auctions reveals that this
is not the case. Rather, the eBay protocol maintains a record of the current
At the close of the auction, all the winning bidders pay the same price, and this price is equal to
the lowest successful bid. These auctions are less frequently used by sellers, and when they are
used, they typically close at the starting price since supply outstrips demand. Thus they are of less
interest and we do not consider them here.
6In addition to this starting bid, eBay also allows the seller to set a secret reserve price. If the
bidding fails to reach this secret reserve price, then the item remains unsold and can be relisted
at a later date. Since this feature incurs an additional charge, and is much less common, we do not
consider it here.
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Fig. 1. Pseudocode for the rule by which the eBay protocol updates the current bid price.
bid price and the highest price entered into the proxy bidding system so far.
Then, whenever a new bidder submits a bid (or more accurately, the new bidder
informs the proxy bidding system of the maximum price it is prepared to bid),
thecurrentbidpriceimmediatelyadvancestotheminimumofthehighestprice
enteredsofarandthesecondhighestpriceplustheminimumbidincrement(see
eBay help: Bid increments at the web address given above; see also Figure 1).
The difference between this update rule and pedestrian bidding is signiﬁcant.
It means that the current bid price of the auction may take any value and is
not restricted to integer multiples of the minimum bid increment, and, as we
describe in the next section, it gives rise to an optimal value for the minimum
bid increment.7 Finally, at the ﬁxed closing time of the auction, the item is
allocated to the bidder who has entered the highest amount into the proxy
bidding system, and that bidder pays the current bid price.
3.1 Example
We illustrate the eBay protocol with a simple example. Consider an auction for
a small item with a starting bid of $1.99. Some time after the auction starts, the
ﬁrst bidder arrives. This bidder has a valuation for the item of $3.50, and thus
enters this amount into the proxy bidding system. In response, the current bid
price of the auction is updated to $1.99, and the minimum bid increment is set
to $0.25 (see lines 16–19 in Figure 1).
7Note that other online auctions, such as the popular Israeli site www.olsale.com, do not provide
automatic bidding at all, but instead enforce manually pedestrian bidding by providing a button
that advances the current bid price by a ﬁxed bid increment each time it is clicked.
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Soon afterward, another bidder notices the auction while browsing the eBay
Web site. This bidder has a valuation for the item of $3.40 and thus enters this
amount in the proxy bidding system. Now, since the ﬁrst bidder has entered a
greater amount, a proxy bid is submitted on its behalf. The current bid price of
the auction is thus updated to $3.50 (i.e., the minimum of $3.50 and $3.40 +
$0.25 according to line 12 in Figure 1), and the second bidder is immediately
informed that it has been outbid by another bidder. Note that if the auction
were to close at this point, the bidder with the highest valuation would have
won, but it would have paid less than the second valuation plus the minimum
bid increment.
Next, a third bidder arrives with a valuation of $3.60. Now the minimum
amount that the proxy bidding system will accept is $3.75 (i.e., $3.50 + $0.25),
and thus despite having the highest valuation so far, this bidder is unable to
submit a bid (see line 14 in Figure 1). In this case, the minimum bid increment
has introduced an inefﬁciency into the auction.
Finally, a fourth bidder arrives with a valuation of $4.00 and enters this
amount in the proxy bidding system. Since this amount is greater than that
entered by the ﬁrst bidder, the current bid price jumps to $3.75 (i.e., the min-
imum of $4.00 and $3.50 + $0.25 according to line 9 in Figure 1). At the clos-
ing time of the auction, the item is allocated to the fourth bidder, who pays
$3.75 for it (plus shipping), and an inspection of the auction bid history will
reveal just three bids (despite the fact that four bidders would have liked to
bid).
Note that in our example, if the third bidder had arrived before the second,
then the fourth bidder would still have won the auction, but the closing price
would have been $3.85. If the fourth bidder, with valuation $4.00, had arrived
ﬁrst then the closing price of the auction could be $3.65, $3.75, or $3.85, de-
pending on which bidder arrived second, and only two bids would be recorded
in the bid history.
4. ANALYSIS OF AUCTION REVENUE
Given the preceding description of the eBay auction protocol, in this section
we consider in detail the effects that the minimum bid increment and the eBay
proxybiddingsystemhaveontheexpectedrevenueoftheauction.Inordertodo
so, we consider two cases that represent different simple strategies adopted by
thebidders.OurpurposeatthispointistounderstandthepropertiesoftheeBay
auction mechanism, rather than searching for equilibrium bidding strategies
for participants. In Section 6, we shall use the results and understanding of the
eBayauctionmechanismdevelopedheretoinformthebiddingstrategyadopted
by bidders within real eBay auctions.
Thus, to this end, we ﬁrst assume that the bidders use the proxy bidding sys-
tem,and,assuggestedbyeBay,theysimplyentertheirvaluationfortheitemas
themaximumamounttheyarewillingtobid.Theythenallowtheproxybidding
system to perform all the necessary bidding on their behalf. We then compare
this proxy bidding case, to one where bidders perform pedestrian bidding. That
is, they monitor the auction and whenever they are outbid by another bidder,
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they increase their bid by the minimum possible amount (assuming that this
amount is less than their valuation of the item).8
From this comparison, we show that, when bidders use the eBay proxy bid-
ding system, there is an optimal value for the minimum bid increment, and,
at this optimum, the revenue exceeds the second highest bidder’s valuation
(but by an amount that is less than the minimum bid increment). However,
with pedestrian bidding, we show that the expected auction revenue decreases
as the minimum bid increment is increased, and, in fact, the expected auc-
tion revenue is always less than that of the second highest bidder’s valuation.
These results show that it is the interaction of the eBay proxy bidding sys-
tem and the minimum bid increment, not the minimum bid increment alone,
that results in the expected auction revenue exceeding the second highest
valuation.
In order to perform this analysis, we assume that N bidders, each with a
private valuation that is drawn from a common valuation distribution, with
density f (v), in the range [v, v], participate in an auction with a starting price
s and a ﬁxed minimum bid increment d. 9 We will assume that, as in the real
eBay auction, these bidders become aware of the auction at different times, and
thus they enter the auction in a random sequence.
We now consider the two cases described above, and, in the ﬁrst instance,
we derive analytical results when N = 2 (in Section 4.4 we present simulation
results for greater numbers of bidders).
4.1 Using the eBay Proxy Bidding System
To calculate the revenue when two bidders use the eBay proxy bidding system,
we must consider the order in which the eBay protocol updates the current
auction price. We assume that the ﬁrst bidder has entered a bid with value v1,
and thus the closing price of the auction depends on this value, the value of the
bid of the second bidder, v2, and on s and d.
We illustrate this with an example, considering the case that v1 is greater
than s+2d but less than v−d. Since v1 is greater than the starting bid, s, the
bid is accepted, and the current bid price of the auction is updated to s. The
8This pedestrian bidding can in principle be achieved by all bidders always entering the minimum
possible amount to the existing eBay proxy bidding system, thus always increasing the current
bid by the minimum bid increment. However, this would necessitate bidders watching the auction
for its entire duration after they submitted an initial bid, so in practice we are thinking about an
alternative possible implementation of a proxy bidding system.
9We note that the assumption of a ﬁxed minimum bid increment, as opposed to one that increases
incrementally with the auction price (as occurs within the real eBay auction and is shown in
Table I), makes no difference to our analysis of the case when N = 2. In this case, the minimum
bid increment is simply determined by the price range into which the auction starting price falls
(and not by the value of submitted bids). In Section 4.4 where we present simulation results for a
greater number of bidders, we maintain this assumption in order to allow comparison with these
earlier results. However, we note that, since the eBay proxy bidding system increases the auction
price rapidly, and since the range of the auction prices over which the minimum bid increment is
large (e.g., over the range $100.00 to $249.99 the minimum bid increment has a value of $2.00),
the majority of the bids will be submitted under a constant minimum bid increment, and thus this
is a reasonable assumption.
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Fig. 2. Digram showing the expected revenue of the auction, E, when two bidders submit bids of
v1 and v2.
expected revenue of the auction, E, will now depend on the bid of the second
bidder, v2, and there are ﬁve different cases to consider. These are shown in
Figure 2 by the ﬁve regions labeled (1) to (5). If v2 is less than s+d, this second
bid will not be accepted, and thus the ﬁrst bidder will be allocated the item and
will pay the current bid of s (region 1 in Figure 2). If, however, v2 is greater than
or equal to s+d, but less than v1, then the second bid will be accepted, but the
item will be allocated to the ﬁrst bidder, who must pay the minimum of v2 + d
and v1 (regions 2 and 3). Finally, if v2 is greater than v1, then this time the item
will be allocated to the second bidder, and this bidder must pay the minimum
of v1 + d and v2 (regions 4 and 5).
To calculate the revenue in the general case, we must consider all the possi-
ble values of s and v1. In doing so, to simplify the analysis somewhat we make
the explicit assumption that s + 2d ≤ v. In the case of a bidders’ valuation
distribution with inﬁnite support (such as an exponential distribution), this
assumption is always satisﬁed. However, in the case of distributions with ﬁnite
support (such as a uniform distribution), it ensures that it is always possible
to raise the current auction price by the minimum bid increment at least twice
before the upper limit of the distribution is exceeded (see Appendix A for re-
sults when this condition is relaxed). We present these cases, and the resulting
auction revenue, below:
v ≤ v1 < s :
E =
 
0, v ≤ v2 < s,
s, s ≤ v2 < v;
(1)
s ≤ v1 < s + d :
E =
⎧
⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎩
s, v ≤ v2 < s + d,
v2, s + d ≤ v2 < v1 + d,
v1 + d, v1 + d ≤ v2 ≤ v;
(2)
s + d ≤ v1 < s + 2d :
E =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
s, v ≤ v2 < s + d,
v1, s + d ≤ v2 < v1,
v2, v1 ≤ v2 < v1 + d,
v1 + d, v1 + d ≤ v2 ≤ v;
(3)
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s + 2d ≤ v1 < v − d :
E =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
s, v ≤ v2 < s + d,
v2 + d, s + d ≤ v2 < v1 − d,
v1, v1 − d ≤ v2 < v1,
v2, v1 ≤ v2 < v1 + d,
v1 + d, v1 + d ≤ v2 ≤ v;
(4)
v − d ≤ v1 ≤ v:
E =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
s, v ≤ v2 < s + d,
v2 + d, s + d ≤ v2 < v1 − d,
v1, v1 − d ≤ v2 < v1,
v2, v1 ≤ v2 ≤ v;
(5)
Now, to calculate the expected auction revenue we must consider each indi-
vidual case and weight the revenue that it generates by the probability that it
occurs. We do so by integrating over the bidders’ valuation distribution, f (v),
between the limits v and v, and thus we derive the result expression shown
below:
E =
  s
v
f (v1)
  v
s
sf (v2) dv 2 dv 1
+
  s+d
s
f (v1)
   s+d
v
sf (v2) dv 2
+
  v1+d
s+d
v2 f (v2) dv 2 +
  v
v1+d
(v1 + d) f (v2) dv 2
 
dv 1
+
  s+2d
s+d
f (v1)
   s+d
v
sf (v2) dv 2 +
  v1
s+d
v1 f (v2) dv 2
+
  v1+d
v1
v2 f (v2) dv 2 +
  v
v1+d
(v1 + d) f (v2) dv 2
 
dv 1
+
  v−d
s+2d
f (v1)
   s+d
v
sf (v2) dv 2
+
  v1−d
s+d
(v2 + d) f (v2) dv 2 +
  v1
s+d
v1 f (v2) dv 2
+
  v1+d
v1
v2 f (v2) dv 2 +
  v
v1+d
(v1 + d) f (v2) dv 2
 
dv 1
+
  v
v−d
f (v1)
   s+d
v
sf (v2) dv 2 +
  v1−d
s+d
(v2 + d) f (v2) dv 2
+
  v1
v1−d
v1 f (v2) dv 2 +
  v
v1
v2 f (v2) dv 2
 
dv 1. (6)
At this point, the results are valid for any bidders’ valuation distribu-
tion; however, since we will compare this analytical calculation to simulation
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results, we must choose a particular distribution to consider. Thus, we make
the common assumption that the bidders’ valuations are drawn from a uni-
form distribution with support [0, 1]. Hence, f (v) = 1, v = 0 and v = 1, and
evaluating the integrals is straightforward. The ﬁnal result is an expression,
in terms of the minimum bid increment, d, and the auction starting price, s,
for the expected revenue of the auction:
E =
 
1
3
+ s2 −
4s3
3
 
+ (1 − 2s + s2)d −
5(1 − s)
2
d2 +
4d3
3
. (7)
This expression shows that the expected auction revenue is dependent on both
thestartingbidoftheauctionandtheminimumbidincrement.Ithasaconstant
term that is equal to the revenue of a conventional English auction, and it has
a maximum value (over the region s ≥ 0, d ≥ 0 and s+2d ≤ 1) when s = 0 and
d = 1
4. Thus the auction generates the maximum revenue when the starting
bid of the auction is zero, and an optimal bid increment is selected. For the case
that we consider here, at this optimal conﬁguration the expected revenue of the
eBay auction is 43
96.
Interestingly, the revenue at this maximum is greater than that achieved by
a conventional English auction using an optimal starting price and inﬁnitesi-
malbidincrements.Inthiscase,theoptimalstartingprice,s∗,canbecalculated
from the standard auction literature (i.e., the result that s∗ = [1 − F(s∗)]/f (s∗)
where F(.) is the cumulative distribution function of the bidders’ valuation dis-
tribution [Riley and Samuelson 1981]). For the uniform distribution that we
consider here, s∗ = 1
2 and the revenue at this optimum is 5
12. We note that the
introduction of the minimum bid increment has produced a substantial lower
optimal starting price, and, indeed, phenomenological studies have indicated
that auctions with lower starting prices produce higher revenue, though there
are many possible justiﬁcations for this [Bajari and Hortacsu 2003]. If we con-
sider the case where s = 0, the expression in shown Equation (7) simpliﬁes
to
E =
1
3
+ d −
5d2
2
+
4d3
3
. (8)
Here it is clear that, as d is reduced to zero, the expected revenue of the auction
falls to the expected valuation of the second highest bidder (i.e., N−1
N+1 or in this
case 1
3).
4.2 Using Pedestrian Bidding
In order to calculate the revenue when bidders engage in pedestrian bid-
ding, we use previously derived results for the revenue of an ascending price
English auction with discrete bid levels. In these auctions, the bids that may
be submitted to the auctioneer are restricted to certain discrete bid levels, and,
in general, this restriction leads the auction to generate less revenue than the
equivalent continuous bid auction [David et al. 2007]. In our previous work, we
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have shown that the expected revenue of these auctions is given by
E =
m−1  
i=0
F(li+1)N − F(li)N
F(li+1) − F(li)
[li(1 − F(li)) − li+1(1 − F(li+1)]
+lm
 
1 − F(lm)N 
, (9)
where N is the number of bidders, F(.) is again the cumulative distribution
function of the bidders’ valuation distribution, and there are m+1 discrete bid
levels with values l0 ···lm.
Now, the case in which two bidders engage in pedestrian bidding within
an eBay auction is exactly analogous to this discrete bid auction. We can set
li = s+id and m =  1−s
d   (where i is the integer index of the ith bid level and  . 
denotes the ﬂoor function), and thus, perform the summation in Equation (9)
analytically, to express the expected revenue as:
E =
 
1
3
+ s2 −
4s3
3
 
−
1 − s
3
d2 +
F(1 − F2)
3
d3, (10)
where F = frac(1−s
d ) — the fractional part of 1−s
d . Note that, in this expression,
the constant term is identical to that for the case of proxy bidding shown in
equation (7). Thus both bidding strategies converge to the same expected rev-
enue when d = 0 (and this revenue is equal to that generated by a conventional
English auction). However, unlike in the case of proxy bidding, this expression
does not contain a term proportional to d. Thus, given the condition that it is
possible to make at least one bid (i.e., 1−s
d ≥ 1), then it is easy to show that
1−s
3 d2 − F(1−F2)
3 d3 ≥ 0 (since F < 1), and, hence, the revenue in the case of
pedestrian bidding is always less than the equivalent continuous bid auction.10
4.3 Revenue Comparison
Having calculated the expected auction revenue when two bidders use the eBay
proxy bidding system or engage in pedestrian bidding, we compare these an-
alytical results to simulation results. Thus, we simulate the behavior of the
bidders, the auction protocol, and the proxy bidding system, and we then hold
repeated auctions with randomly drawn bidders’ valuations. In each auction,
we record the closing price, and thus, we calculate the mean auction revenue.
10Rothkopf and Harstad [1994] considered a similar case in which two bidders, with valuation
drawn from a uniform distribution with support [0, 1], engage in pedestrian bidding within an oral
ascending price English auction. They showed that if there are m+1 evenly spaced bid levels, with
l0 = 0 and lm = 1, then the expected revenue of the auction is given by
E =
1
3
−
1
3m2 . (11)
When s = 0 and d = 1/m, the expression in Equation (10) simpliﬁes to give the same result, and
thus clearly shows that increasing the number of bid levels (effectively decreasing the minimum
bid increment) causes the revenue to more closely approximate the continuous bid case.
Furthermore,theyshowedthatshowraisingthebidbytheminimumbidincrement,andnotjump
bidding (i.e., raising the bid by greater than this minimum increment), is an equilibrium bidding
strategy in the case of nondecreasing valuation distributions such as the uniform distribution
considered here.
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Fig. 3. Comparison of simulation (solid lines) and calculated (circles) results showing the depen-
dence of the expected auction revenue on the minimum bid increment for both the eBay proxy
bidding system and pedestrian bidding. Results are for 2 bidders with valuations drawn uniformly
on [0,1] and s = 0. Simulation results are averaged over 500,000 auctions.
Figure 3 shows simulation results (for proxy bidding and pedestrian bidding)
as solid lines for s = 0 and a range of minimum bid increments, from 0 to 0.5.
In this plot, and all subsequent ones, the simulations are repeated a sufﬁcient
numberoftimes(inthiscase500,000times)thatthestandarderrorinthemean
auction revenue approaches the thickness of plotted line, and thus error bars
are not shown. In this ﬁgure, we also show (as circles) the analytical results
calculatedintheprevioussection.Clearly,thesimulationandcalculatedresults
match exactly.
As previously described, the eBay proxy bidding system shows an optimal
value for the minimum bid increment, at which the expected revenue reaches a
maximum that is greater than the expected second highest valuation (but less
than the expected second highest valuation plus the minimum bid increment).
The cause of the optimal bid increment is clear. When the bid increment is
small, increasing its value directly increases the closing price of the auction,
andthustheexpectedauctionrevenueincreaseswithincreasingbidincrement.
However, increasing the bid increment also increases the probability that one
of the bidders is excluded from the auction (this bidder will be unable to raise
the current auction price by the minimum bid increment). Since the closing
price is dependent on the bid of the second highest bidder, increasing the bid
increment beyond a certain value results in a decrease in the expected auction
revenue.
However, in the case of pedestrian bidding, the expected revenue decreases
as the minimum bid increment increases, and our previous analysis has shown
that this is a general phenomenon that occurs whenever the bidding within
an auction is restricted to discrete bid levels (see David et al. [2007] for a
more detailed explanation of this effect). Thus these results show that it is the
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Fig. 4. Simulation results showing the dependence of the expected auction revenue on the mini-
mum bid increment for both the eBay proxy bidding system and pedestrian bidding. Results are for
20 bidders with valuations drawn uniformly on [0,1] and s = 0. Results are averaged over 500,000
auctions.
interaction of the eBay proxy bidding system and the minimum bid increment,
rather than the minimum bid increment alone, that results in the increase in
revenue seen in the eBay auction protocol.
4.4 More Than Two Bidders
When there are more than two bidders, the analysis of both proxy bidding
and pedestrian bidding becomes more complex. It is possible to obtain analytic
expressions for the revenue for any ﬁxed N, but these are increasingly long
and difﬁcult to work with. However, we can easily perform simulations, and
thus Figure 4 shows comparisons of simulation results for the two bidding
behaviors when N = 20. As before, we see that the eBay bidding proxy shows
an optimal bid increment (at a smaller value of d than before), at which the
expected revenue has a maximum value. However, pedestrian bidding results
in a general decrease in auction revenue as the bid increment increases. As
expected, both curves meet at the point where d = 0, and the revenue at this
point corresponds to the expected valuation of the second highest bidder.11
Figure 5 shows more simulation results for the eBay bidding proxy when
there are 10, 20, and 40 bidders participating. These results show that, as the
number of bidders increases, the size of the optimal bid increment decreases.
In the case of the uniform bidders’ valuation distribution, the optimal bid in-
crement is approximately equal to 1
N+1. While we have not been able to fully
11Note that the pedestrian bidding plot shows a number of minima, or “corners,” that correspond
to points where an integer multiple of the minimum bid increment falls exactly on the upper limit
of the bidders’ valuation distribution. This effect also occurs in Figure 3, and is captured by the
analytical results (by the term dependent on F), but is much less apparent due to the smaller
number of bidders.
ACM Transactions on The Web, Vol. 1, No. 2, Article 9, Publication date: August 2007.Article 9 / 16 • A. Rogers et al.
Fig. 5. Simulation results showing the dependence of the expected auction revenue on the number
of bidders using proxy bidding. Results are shown for 10, 20, and 40 bidders with valuations drawn
from a uniform distribution on [0,1]. The starting price s = 0 and results are averaged over 500,000
auctions.
characterize this result analytically, through simulation we have observed that
the optimal bid increment is closely related to the expected difference in value
between the two highest bids received by the auctioneer (in the case of a uni-
form distribution on [0,1] the expected difference between any two bids is equal
to 1
N+1). We can understand this intuitively since increasing the bid increment
further increases the probability that the bidders with the highest valuations
will be excluded from the auction (i.e., their valuation will not be sufﬁcient to
allow them to raise the current auction price by the minimum bid increment),
while decreasing the bid increment will reduce the amount that the winning
bidder pays, and in doing so will decrease the revenue.
We have conﬁrmed this result for a number of different valuation distribu-
tions. For example, Figure 6 shows similar results when the bidders’ valuations
are drawn from a normal distribution with mean 100 and standard deviation 5.
In this case, the optimal bid increment is again closely related to the expected
difference in value between the highest bids, but, due to the tail of the distribu-
tion, there is much less dependence on the number of bidders. It is interesting
to note that, in this example, the values of the mean and standard deviation
were chosen to match data from a study of real eBay auctions for GameBoy
Advance consoles [Shah et al. 2003]. For this price range ($100.00 to $249.99),
the actual eBay bid increment is $2.50, and is thus close to the optimum shown
in our simulations.12
12One criticism of this correspondence may be that the number of bidders shown in our simulation
is much greater than that generally observed in real eBay auctions. However, in the next section,
we show that this is not necessarily the case, and in general the number of bids observed in the
auction is much smaller than the number of bidders who attempted to place a bid (and are denoted
by N here).
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Fig. 6. Simulation results showing the dependence of the expected auction revenue on the number
of bidders using proxy bidding. Results are shown for 10, 20, and 40 bidders with valuations drawn
fromanormaldistribution N[100, 5].Thestartingprices = 0andresultsareaveragedover500,000
auctions.
These results indicate that in the context of eBay auctions the minimum bid
increment is a design parameter, and thus it is a variable which the auctioneer
may wish to adjust for different auctions in order to maximize the expected
revenue. This is in contrast to other auction protocols, in which the minimum
bid increment (or choice of discrete bid levels) is a forced necessity, which helps
control the duration of the auction, but reduces revenue [Rothkopf and Harstad
1994; David et al. 2007].
5. ANALYSIS OF THE BID HISTORY
In the previous section, we considered the effects that the eBay proxy bidding
system and the minimum bid increment have on the revenue of the auction. In
this section, we continue our analysis of the proxy bidding system, and consider
the fact that, unlike conventional auctions, an eBay auction does not commence
with all the bidders being present. Instead, the bidders arrive in a random or-
der that is deﬁned by the time at which they ﬁrst become aware of the auction’s
existence. Since the eBay bidding proxy protocol immediately updates the cur-
rent bid price whenever a new bid is submitted, many of the bidders who enter
the auction will ﬁnd that the current price of the auction has already advanced
to a price such that they are unable submit an acceptable bid (i.e., they can not
advance the auction price by the minimum bid increment).
Thiseffectleadstotwoimportantobservations,andwepresentananalysisof
both here. Firstly, we show that the number of bids that are observed in an eBay
auction (and recorded in the auction history) can be substantially smaller than
the number of bidders who would have liked to place a bid. Second, we show
thattheminimumbidincrementintroducesaninefﬁciencyintotheauction,and
thus the probability of any bidder winning the auction is dependent on when
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the bidder attempts to place its bid. Bidders who submit their valuations to the
eBay bidding proxy earlier in the auction have a greater chance of winning the
auction.
5.1 Expected Number of Bids Observed
In our simulations of the eBay auction protocol, we have assumed that N bid-
ders participate within the auction and attempt to place a bid. However, as
described above, many of these bidders ﬁnd that their valuation is insufﬁcient
to allow them to advance the current bid price by the minimum bid increment,
and thus their bid is not accepted by the proxy bidding system. Thus, despite
there being N potential bidders, the number of bids observed in the bid history,
which we will denote n, can be less than N.
In the general case, the number of bids observed will depend on the the start-
ing price, the bid increment, the bidders’ valuation distributions, and the order
in which the bidders attend the auction. However, we are able to calculate an-
alytically the expected number of bids observed by considering the special case
when d = 0 and s = 0. This case is attractive as it represents the maximum
numberofbidsthatareobserved;increasingeithertheminimumbidincrement
or the starting bid only reduces the chance that a bidder will have a valuation
sufﬁcient to submit a bid. Most importantly, the result is completely indepen-
dent of any assumption regarding the distribution of the bids submitted and is
thus independent of assumptions the bidders’ valuation distributions (includ-
ing the assumption that they all share a common valuation distribution) and
their bidding strategies.
Thus, in order to calculate this upper bound, we consider that N bidders
come to the auction in a random order and each submits a single bid into the
eBay proxy bidding system. We make no assumptions regarding the speciﬁc
timing of these bids, but only that order in which the bids are submitted is
independent of their valuation. Thus our model covers the case that bidders
behave as instructed by eBay and submit their valuation to the proxy bidding
system as soon as they become aware of the auction.13
In this case, with both d = 0 and s = 0, the bids submitted by the ﬁrst two
bidders will always be accepted. Subsequent bids will only be accepted if the
bid amount is greater than the second highest bid received so far. Thus, if we
denotebyHN theexpectednumberoftimesthatthesecondhighestbidreceived
changes as we sequentially consider the N bids, then, the expected number of
bids observed, n, is given by
n = 1 + HN. (12)
13Although it is not our principal interest here, it is important to note that this model also applies
to cases where bidders may also attempt to snipe, and thus submit a last minute bid. In addition,
we are not restricted to considering truthful bidding so long as we assume that these decision are
independent of the bidder’s valuation. This may not actually be the case in real eBay auctions
since such strategic decisions are likely to be inﬂuenced in some way by the bidder’s valuation and
the current price of the auction when they ﬁrst discover it. Indeed, there may also be correlations
between the bidders’ valuation and the time at which the auction was ﬁrst noticed (i.e., bidders
with higher valuations may seek out auctions more proactively than bidders with low valuations)
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We can derive a recursive expression for HN by considering the effect of adding
one more bid to the original sequence of N bids. If this additional bid has the
highest,orthesecondhighestvalue,outofall N+1bids,thenitwillbeaccepted.
The probability of this occurring is identical to the probability that the value
of the last bid in a random permutation of N + 1 bids is the highest or second
highest out of all N + 1 bids. It is simply given by 2
N+1, and thus, we have
HN+1 = HN +
2
N + 1
. (13)
Now, when there are just two bids, the second highest bid can change once
and once only, and thus H2 = 1. Using this result and the recursive expression
above gives the following simple result:
HN =
N  
j=2
2
j
. (14)
We can approximate this expression for large N using the standard asymptotic
approximation for the harmonic series:
N  
j=1
1
j
= ln(N) + γ +
1
2N
+ O(N−2), (15)
where γ is Euler’s constant, which has a value of 0.577215665. Thus, for large
N, the expected number of bids observed is given approximately by
n ≈ 2ln(N) + (2γ − 1) +
1
N
. (16)
Figure 7 shows a comparison of this analytical expression and simulation
results, and the agreement between the two is extremely good, even for rel-
atively small N. Most striking about this result is the fact that the number
of bids observed is signiﬁcantly less than the number of bidders who attempt
to place bids. For example, when 40 bidders attempt to place bids, on average
less than eight of them are successful. The logarithmic relationship between
the number of potential bidders and the bids observed is particularly striking
since it contrasts with the more familiar result that the longest increasing sub-
sequence in a random permutation follows a
√
N relationship as N becomes
large [Johansson 1998].
Note again that this is a general result that is independent of any assump-
tions regarding how the value of the bids was derived or the timing of their
submittal. It is dependent solely on the sequential manner in which the eBay
auction protocol updates the current bid price (and only assumes that the or-
der that they are submitted is independent of their valuation). In addition, it
represents an upper bound in that increasing the starting price, s, or the bid
increment, d, generally results in fewer bids being observed. We illustrate this
in Figure 7 by also showing the number of expected bids received for several
values of d when bidders’ valuations are uniformly drawn on [0,1] and, as be-
fore, bidders directly enter their valuations into the proxy bidding system. As
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Fig. 7. Comparison of simulation (solid lines) and calculated (circles) results showing the number
of bids observed (n) compared to the number of bidders who attempted to place a bid (N). The
starting price s = 0 and for results where d > 0, bidders’ valuations are drawn uniformly on [0,1].
Results are averaged over 500,000 auctions.
expected, as the minimum bid increment increases, the number of successfully
submitted bids decreases.
This result is signiﬁcant as it indicates that the bid history (i.e., the record of
submitted bids that eBay records) is far from complete and thus empirical stud-
ies of eBay auctions that use this bid history in a na¨ ıve manner will incorporate
systematic errors into their results. A number of researchers have noted simi-
lar ﬁndings, and have presented approaches to attempt to deal with this issue.
For example, Harstad and Rothkopf (2000) considered an oral English auction
and noted that many of the bidders who are present and willing to bid may not
actually submit bids since they are unable to attract the attention of the auc-
tioneer before the auction price exceeds their private valuation. They proposed
an “alternating recognition” model of oral English auctions as an alternative to
the model proposed by Milgrom and Weber (1982) in which the prices at which
all bidders depart the auction are directly observed. This “alternating recogni-
tion” model results in a lower expected revenue for the auctioneer. Similarly,
Haile and Tamer (2003) recognized that the bids submitted by bidders within
an English auction with private valuations may not necessarily represent the
maximum amount that they are willing to pay since again the auction price
may advance past their valuation before they can attract the auctioneer’s at-
tention (although they still assumed that the total number of potential bidders
is known). They used this observation to calculate a nonparametric bound on
the bidders’ valuation distribution. Finally, Jiang and Leyton-Brown (2007) de-
scribed the problem of missing bids in eBay auctions, and used an expectation-
maximisation algorithm to estimate distributions of their number and valua-
tion (although they ignored the minimum bid increment and also assumed that
the maximum bid received from any bidder represents its private valuation).
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Fig. 8. Simulation results showing the probability of each bidder winning the auction depending
on the order in which they bid. There are 20 bidders with valuations drawn uniformly on [0,1] and
s = 0. Results are averaged over 107 auctions.
However, none of these researchers presented a quantitative analysis of this
effect, and in particular the logarithmic dependence of non N has not been pre-
viously exposed. This dependence indicates that, when N is large, the majority
of bidders are hidden from the auctioneer, and thus visible bidders are a small
sample of a larger population.
5.2 Effect of Bid Timing
As well as affecting the number of bids that are observed in the bid history, the
fact that bidders may ﬁnd that they are unable to advance the current bid price
by the minimum bid increment also has a key impact on whether or not the
bidder with the highest valuation does in fact win the auction. When d = 0, the
bidder with the highest valuation is always able to submit its bid, and thus will
always win the auction. However, when d > 0 this is not the case. It is possible
for the current price of the auction to have increased to the point that the bidder
who has the highest valuation is actually unable to bid, since its valuation is
less than the current price plus the minimum bid increment. This introduces
a source of inefﬁciency into the eBay protocol, and thus, when d > 0, the order
in which the bids are submitted has an effect on determining the winner of the
auction (an example of this was presented in Section 3.1).
Figure 8 shows simulation results for an auction in which 20 bidders attempt
to place bids. In this plot, the x-axis denotes the order in which the bidders
attempt to place their bids within the auction (i.e., 1 is the ﬁrst bidder and 20
is the last bidder) and the y-axis is the probability of this bidder winning the
auction. Each bidder’s valuation is drawn uniformly in the range [0, 1], and
the bidders submit this valuation to the eBay proxy bidding system. Since the
bidders are symmetrical, when d = 0 all the bidders have an equal 1 in 20
chance of winning the auction (i.e., the ﬁgure shows a straight line at 0.05).
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Fig. 9. Simulation results showing (a) the probability of winning, and (b) the expected proﬁt, when
the bidders with the highest and second highest valuations bid ﬁrst, at a random time, and last.
There are 20 bidders with valuations drawn uniformly on [0,1] and s = 0. Results are averaged
over 107 auctions.
However, as the value of the bid increment is increased, those bidders who bid
early have a greater chance of winning. This is because the bidders who arrive
later, while possibly having greater valuations, will ﬁnd that the current price
of the auction has increased to a point that leaves them unable to submit their
bid.
Figure 9 shows similar results, but this time we consider just the bidders
with the highest and second highest valuations. Speciﬁcally, in Figure 9(a),
we show the probability of these bidders winning the auction, when they bid
ﬁrst, last, and at a random time. In Figure 9(b), we consider the same three
cases,butweshowtheexpectedproﬁtofthebidderswiththehighestandsecond
highest valuations. We ﬁrst note that the bidder with the highest valuation will
always win the auction when either d = 0 or it bids ﬁrst. Conversely, the bidder
with the second highest valuation will never win if either d = 0 or it bids last.
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However,asd increases,bothbidderscanincreasestheirprobabilityofwinning
by bidding earlier. This effect is mirrored in Figure 9(b). As expected, when
the bidder with the highest valuation bids ﬁrst (and thus wins the auction),
its expected proﬁt is greatest. However, when this bidder does not bid ﬁrst, its
expectedproﬁtdecreases.Likewise,bybiddingearly,thebidderwiththesecond
highest valuation can increases its expected proﬁt (since in now has a ﬁnite
chance of winning the auction). Most notable in this plot is the fact that, while
the effect of the bid increment on the auctioneer’s revenue is relatively small,
it has a most signiﬁcant effect on the expected proﬁt of the winning bidder.
Thus the impact of the minimum bid increment is not felt by the auctioneer,
but rather by bidders who attempt to submit their bids late and then ﬁnd that
they are not accepted by the proxy bidding system since they do not exceed the
current auction price by the minimum bid increment. Indeed, this may occur
despite them actually having the highest valuation for the item (and thus they
would have won the auction had they bid earlier).
These results suggest that it is always better to submit a bid as early as
possible in the auction. However, this observation would appear to contradict
the literature that suggests that sniping is an effective and prevalent strategy
within an eBay auction [Roth and Ockenfels 2003]. Thus, having completed our
analysisofthepropertiesoftheeBayprotocol,weconsiderhowtheseproperties
determine the strategy that a bidder should adopt.
6. BIDDING BEHAVIOR
The analysis of the eBay auction protocol that we presented in the previous
sections indicates that the timing of bids has a signiﬁcant effect on the outcome
of the auction. In particular, the analysis shows that bidders with private val-
uations, who enter these valuations as the maximum amounts that they are
prepared to bid, should submit their bids as soon as they become aware of the
auction. Indeed, to do so is an equilibrium strategy since delaying bidding al-
ways increases the probability that the current auction price will advance to a
point such that it is impossible to submit a bid at all.
However, it seems this bidding behavior is not commonly observed in real
eBay auctions. Rather, many bidders engage in incremental bidding, while oth-
ers refrain from bidding until the last few minutes of the auction [Bajari and
Hortacsu 2004]. A number of reasons have been proposed for this behavior.
First, incremental bidding has been ascribed to the presence of inexperienced
or na¨ ıve bidders within the auction. These bidders either do not understand
the proxy bidding system, or are simply not prepared to enter their full valu-
ations. Sniping is an effective response to these bidders. By submitting a bid
in the last minutes of the auction, the snipers leave the incremental bidders
insufﬁcient time to respond, and thus do not have to outbid the full valuation
of these bidders [Roth and Ockenfels 2003]. Second, in a common-value auc-
tion, where incremental bidding may be a sign of bidders actually updating
their valuation of the item in response to other bids, sniping is again favored
[Bajari and Hortacsu 2003]. By bidding early, a bidder may signal information
about its valuation to other bidders. This leaking of information is avoided by
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submitting a bid so close to the end of the auction that other bidders do not
have time to update their valuations and respond with a revised bid. Finally,
sniping may also protect a bidder from a form of shill bidding, commonly known
as maximum bid ﬁshing, whereby the seller submits small incremental shill
bids to expose the value of the highest bid [Barbaro and Bracht 2004; Engelberg
and Williams 2005].
Thus, in real eBay auctions there are clearly very good reasons for sniping,
and a number of software tools are available to automate this behavior. These
tools range from software programs that may be run on the bidders’ own com-
puters (e.g., JBidwatcher), to commercial online sniping services that either
charge a ﬁxed subscription fee or variable fee depending on the ﬁnal auction
closing price (e.g., eSnipe or AuctionStealer). They typically allow bids to be
submitted in the last 20 s of the auction14 and measure Internet server delays
to ensure that bids reach the eBay server at the correct time. Thus, given the
ease of sniping, it is expected that within competitive auctions a number of
bidders will use this strategy, and that this trend will increase in the future
[Bapna 2003].
Given that by deﬁnition sniping does not allow other bidders time to respond
with an updated bid (and this is almost certainly true in the last 20 s of the
auction), in the ﬁnal stages of an auction we should see exactly the type of
bidding that we have modeled and analyzed here. That is, bidders must submit
a single bid to the proxy bidding system that represents their ﬁnal valuations
for the item. This is even true in the case of common-value auctions, since from
this point onward no more information can be revealed to the other bidders
[Song 2004]. Thus, given the reasons described above, bidders in real eBay
auctions should indeed snipe, but the analysis presented within this article
indicates that they should refrain from bidding in the very last seconds of the
auction. They should attempt to submit their bids late enough so that other
bidders cannot respond with updated bids, but no later, to prevent themselves
beingexcludedbysimilarbidssubmittedbytheircompetitors.15 Inotherwords,
they should aim to “snipe before the snipers.”
7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this article, we have performed a detailed mathematical analysis of the eBay
auction protocol. Our aim has been to understand how the particular features
of the eBay auction, and speciﬁcally the minimum bid increment and proxy
bidding system, affect the properties of the auction and the resulting behavior
of bidders. We initially considered the revenue of the auction, and challenged
the common assumption that the eBay protocol acts as a second price auction
in which the expected revenue is equal to the second highest bidder’s valuation
14Some online sniping services ﬁx this time, others allow it to be speciﬁed by the bidder. In addition,
others provide a tiered service depending upon payment. For example, AuctionStealer provides a
free service to bid 10 seconds before the end of the auction, and a premium service to bid 3 seconds
before the end.
15Note that this approach also minimizes the possibility that a snipe bid accidentally arrives after
the auction has closed. This is a real risk when attempting to bid in the very last seconds of the
auction, and is one that we do not explicitly consider here.
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plus the minimum bid increment. We showed that this assumption is too sim-
plistic, and in fact, the proxy bidding system and the minimum bid increment
interact with one another to yield an optimal bid increment that depends on
the number of participants.
We then considered the fact that bidders within an eBay auction are not all
present at the start of the auction, but instead, arrive in sequence depending on
whentheyﬁrstbecomeawareoftheauction’sexistence.Whenthesebiddersuse
the proxy bidding system, the result is that the current bid price of the auction
increases rapidly, and thus the number of bids observed within the auction can
be signiﬁcantly smaller than the number of bidders who would have liked to
place a bid. We showed that this leads to an inefﬁciency within the auction
whereby the bidder with the highest valuation is no longer guaranteed to win.
Finally,weconsideredthebidders’behaviorinrealeBayauctions.Weshowed
that the bidding behavior that we modeled and analyzed here also describes
the bidding in the last seconds of an auction in which several bidders submit
snipe bids (and this is true even in the case of common values). As such, we
showed that our analysis informs the bidding strategy that should be adopted
in this case, and we showed that bidders should “snipe before the snipers.”
This result contrasts with the common assumption (supported by commercial
sniping software that offer premium sniping services in the very last seconds
of the auction) that bidding as late as possible is most successful.
Our future work in this area concerns three main issues. First, we would like
to characterize through experimentation the optimal time at which to submit a
snipe bid. This time will depend on the responsiveness of incremental bidders
within typical real-world auctions and is thus impossible to quantify analyti-
cally. This task is made more difﬁcult by the fact that unsuccesful snipe bids
are hidden from the bid history, and are only observed by the individual sniping
service. Second, we would like to extend the model of the eBay auction that we
consider. Our analysis has addressed the effect of the starting bid since this
most closely parallels the reserve price considered in the standard economic
auction literature. However, eBay also allows sellers to declare an invisible re-
serve price, and also charge a ﬁxed shipping cost. Thus, in practice, all three
factors contribute to the revenue of the eBay auction, and we would like to per-
form a detailed analysis of this. Finally, we would like to extend our analysis of
the bidding behavior within the eBay auction to consider fully the effect that
na¨ ıve, irrational, and common-value bidders may have on the auction revenue.
Such considerations are particularly important in the case of online auctions
where the experience of bidders varies greatly, and hence no equilibrium bid-
ding strategy is apparent. In extending our analysis in this way, we hope to
gain further insights into the behavior of bidders within real online auctions.
APPENDIX
EXPECTED EBAY AUCTION REVENUE IN TO ADDITIONAL CASES
In Section 4.1 we calculated the expected revenue of the eBay auction when
two bidders used the proxy bidding system. In doing so we explicitly made
the assumption that it was possible to raise the current auction price by the
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minimum bid increment at least twice (i.e., s+2d ≤ v). In this section we relax
this constraint and consider the three additional cases that occur as the staring
price and minimum bid increment are increased beyond this limit. Speciﬁcally,
we consider the cases where s + d ≤ v < s + 2d, v < s + d, and v < s, and we
note that in each case, the expected revenue of the auction decreases.
—Case 1. s + d ≤ v < s + 2d. This case is similar to the one presented in
earlier in the article; however, it is never possible for the auction to close at
a price equal to the bid of the ﬁrst bidder plus the minimum bid increment.
The restricted number of auction outcomes, given all possible combinations
of s, d, v1, and v2, are now given by
v ≤ v1 < s:
E =
 
0, v ≤ v2 < s,
s, s ≤ v2 < v; (17)
s ≤ v1 < v − d:
E =
⎧
⎨
⎩
s, v ≤ v2 < s + d,
v2, s + d ≤ v2 < v1 + d,
v1 + d, v1 + d ≤ v2 ≤ v;
(18)
v − d ≤ v1 < s + d:
E =
 
s, v ≤ v2 < s + d,
v2, s + d ≤ v2 < v; (19)
s + d ≤ v1 < v:
E =
⎧
⎨
⎩
s, v ≤ v2 < s + d,
v1, s + d ≤ v2 < v1,
v2, v1 ≤ v2 < v.
(20)
Integrating over the bidders’ valuation distribution and again assuming a
uniform valuation distribution with support [0, 1] gives the expected revenue
of the auction:
E =
1 − s
2
[(1 + 3s2) − d2]. (21)
As expected, at the boundary condition where s + 2d = 1 this expression
yields the same expected revenue as that shown in Equation (7). However,
the maximum revenue achievable in this case (over the region s ≥ 0, d ≥ 0,
and s+d ≤ 1 < s+2d) occurs when s = 1
11(3+ 4 √
3) and d = 1
11(4− 2 √
3). Note
that the maximum revenue is less than that generated earlier in the article
where s = 0 and d = 1
4 were found to be optimum parameter values.
—Case 2. v < s + d. In this case, once an initial bid has been received, it is not
possible for any other bids to be accepted (no bidder can have a valuation
greater than s+d—the minimum acceptable bid). Thus in this case we have
the following conditions:
v ≤ v1 < s:
E =
 
0, v ≤ v2 < s,
s, s ≤ v2 < v; (22)
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s ≤ v1 < v:
E = s, (23)
and the expected revenue of the auction (again assuming a uniform bidders’
valuation distribution with support [0, 1]) is given by
E = s(1 − s2). (24)
Clearly, the auction closes at a price of s, unless both bidders have valuations
less than s. The expected revenue is thus solely dependent on the starting
price of the auction, and this actually corresponds to both bidders being given
sequentialtake-it-or-leave-itoffersataprices.Themaximumrevenueinthis
case occurs when s =
 
1
3 and has value 2
3
 
1
3. Note that this less than the
previous case, and the general case described in Section 4.1.
—Case 3. v < s. In this case it is impossible for any bidder to submit an initial
bid and thus E = 0.
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